乱后皇帝对宦官的信任和利用便与此不无关系。在同样背景下，我们看到的现象，如马基雅维里所论，君主“在他的国家里选拔一些有识之士，单独让他们享有对他讲真话的自由权”，“一位君主应该常常征求意见，但是应该在他自己愿意的时候，而不是在他人愿意的时候”[113]。结合本文所论，前者如皇帝赋予谏官之疏奏特权，后者如皇帝掌控的延英召对。这是特定背景下，皇帝出于维护自身权力、利益的考虑，采取的皇帝制度对政治环境的适应性调整。当然，这还是一个需要进一步加以实证说明的问题。

On the Changing Methods of the Institutional Communication between the Emperor and Officials in the Central Government in the Tang Dynasty

Ye Wei

Abstract：How to precisely and promptly make use of information submitted by the subjects was one of the core concerns of Chinese emperors. This paper attempts to analyze the institutional regulations on the oral and written petitions submitted by the officials to the central government，especially those consultants-in-ordinary. The An Lushan Rebellion marks a watershed here. Before the rebellion，the modification concentrates on regulating of the levels，procedures，and functions of the petitions. After the rebellion，by privileging some officials with their rights of submitting the petition directly to the emperor，the emperor played a more active role in processing information. The evidence shows that he was able to decide discussion topics in the court，to select discussants，and the methods of the officials’involvement in the discussions.